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NOTE AND COMMENT
EPITHETICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ANNEXATION OF FIXTU"St.-If we
begin with all the facts of a controversy and proceed inductively to deter-
mine the rights of the parties litigant, we thus arrive at a jurisprudence of
rights, whereas, if we reason deductively from a rule, a definition, or a
maxim of law to its application in the facts of our case, we can at best attain
only a jurisprudence of rules, which has been so aptly characterized as an
epithetical jurisprudence. The subject of fixtures is one in which we have
great difficulty in applying the inductive method because the courts have
been slower in approaching the subject scientifically in this field of the law
than in others.
In the recent case of Hanson v. Voss, *(Minn., Dec. 12, 1919), 175 N. W.
1i3, the court decides that "if the holder of a ground lease erects an apart-
ment building and installs a gas range and a door-bed in each flat and there-
after forfeits the lease, these articles will pass as fixtures to the owner of the
realty, if no rights of a third party are infringed and there is no agreement
to the contrary." The law of the case is well stated in the syllabus, and is in
accord with the weight of authority, and the opinion has the least possible
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discussion of definition of fixtures and of annexation. It would seem that
this court has done its best to escape from the older mechanical reasoning
and comes out right because it does not proceed deductively from a defini-
tion to its application in the particular instance, but by the inductive approach
to the rights of the parties on the basis of all the facts. The court s,'ys, "the
manner of annexation is not decisive but only one of the several facts to be
taken into account." This is in refreshing contrast to the earlier cases with
their labored grammatical interpretations of the word "annexation." The
historical route over which the courts have traveled to reach this rational
law is perhaps worth retracing.
In an Anonymous Case, Y. B., 21 Hen. VII, 26, pl. 4, (15o6), a furnace
fixed to the freehold descended to the heir. In Herlakenden's Case, 4 Co. 62a,
63b, (iS89), wainscoting nailed to the wall went to the heir. In this case
the court said, "be it annexed to the house by the lessor or lessee it is
parcel of the house." In Squier v. Mayer, Freem. C.C. 249, (1701), it was
decided that a furnace fixed to the freehold and hangings nailed to the wall
went to the executor. The reason for these contradictory decisions is easy
to see. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in all questions of
property law, the concept of seisin is uppermost in the minds of the courts.
Now it is evident that if there is affixing of the material of the chattel to the
realty, either by accession or by annexation, the holder of the realty is seised
of the fixture. As the mind of the court is thus fixed on the annexation, the
intention of the party who annexes is ignored. Indeed, in the dictum in
Herlakenden's Case, supra, the court said that the intention of the lessor or
lessee had nothing to do with the decision. It is a matter of some surprise
that the courts did not avail themselves of the precedent in Roman law in
regard to "immovables by destination," which had existed since the time
of Labeo (see citation given later). Bracton apparently followed the classic
Roman law in this. He says horreum frumentarum novum, * * * in praedio
Semphronii positum, non erit Semphronji (lib. 2, C. 2, Section 4, fol. i0).
Brvcton is here talking of accession and not of annexation, to be sure, but
the crib destined for storing grain is described as movable because of this
destination and not as an immovable, although it is firmly affixed to the
soil of Sempronius. The courts of this period were certainly well versed
in the Roman law, as we know from Lord Holt's celebrated excursus on
bailments in the case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raymond, 909 (1701). Sir
Nathan Wright, who presided over the chancery court and gave the opinion
in Squier v. Mayer, was a contemporary of Lord Holt, but the Lord Keeper
is apparently blinded here by the concept of seisin. so that he fails to see
the possibility of help from the Roman source. The common law concept of
seisin seems to have the same effect on him that it had on Lord Holt in
Heydon v. Heydon, i Salk. 392, (1693), where Holt decides that partners
are seised as joint tenants, and ignores the holding as tenants in partnership,
just as here the Lord Keeper sees the annexation but misses the evidences
of intent. The only reason that the court in Squier v. Mayer reaches a con-
clusion contrary to that of the Anonymous Case of 15o6 (supra), and of
Herlakenden's Case (supra) is that it interprets the facts differently. There
NOTE AND COMMENT
is no hint that the court considers at all the intention of the parties. It is
possible that we have here a premonition of the decision in Wiltshear v.
Cottrell (post) in which attachment by gravity alone is held not to be
annexation. It will be observed, too, that as half these cases were decided
one way and half the other, on the same state of facts, the deductive pro-
cedure by the definitional route has brought us to the right conclusion in
only fifty per cent of the cases.
During the eighteenth century the courts that followed these cases as
precedents would come out on one side or the other according to whether
the physical nexus were more or less intimate. This practically reduced the
law on the subject to a nullity as the only question was one of physical fact.
Even Lord Mansfield who begins to swing toward the test of intention as
being the more significant, speaks of the "reason of the things," first, and
the "intention," second; and by the "reason of the thing" he apparently means
that they have become annexed to the inheritance. He calls them "acces-
sories." Lawton v. Salmon, 2 H. Bl. 259 note (K. B. 1782).
As late as the latter half of the nineteenth century the English court
decided that a heavy building, attached to the earth only by its weight, was,
as a matter of definition, not legally annexed. The court said, "we are
bound by the authorities to consider such an erection as a mere chattel."
Wiltshear v. Cottrell, i E. & B., 2 Q. B. 674, (1853). This seems to estab-
lish, or confirm, the doctrine that attachment by gravity alone is not annex-
ation. In the next year, however, the New York Court in Snedeker v. War-
itng, io N. Y. 170, 175, (1854), said, "a thing may be as firmly fixed'to the
land by gravitation as by clamps or cement." Thus far, the New York Court
follows the English case in its grammatical method of interpretation of the
word "annexation," but comes to a diametrically opposite conclusion, i. e.,
that a material nexas, is not necessary, if we have the invisible, intangible,
force of gravitation to hold the chattel to the realty. Dean Pound has called
attention to the fact that in the period succeeding our American Revolution
the Anglophobia of the times sometimes got into our courts. Either because
of his prejudice or because the court recognized that the Roman law would
strengthen the decision, which was in direct conflict with that of the English
Court in Wiltshear v. Cottrell, he quoted the rule from Labeo that the court
had missed in. the case of Squier v. Mayer, supra. Ulpian says that, Labeo
generaliter scribit ea, quae perpetui usus causa in aediflciis sunt, aedificii esse.
Dig. 19, 1, 17. This is the basis of the rule in modern French law relative
to immovables by "destination." Cf. Code Napoleon, Section 524; also Brac-
ton 1. c. supra. Cf. also La. Civ. Code, Section 468.
It may be remarked in passing that, although the word "destination" of
the French Code seems to cover the same ground as "intention" in English
law, there are some important distinctions between them Fixtures in Eng-
lish law can include only inanimate objects, while pigeons in their cotes, rab-
bits in their warrens, fish in fish ponds, may be imineuble par destination.
Also in French law no one can make a fixture except the owner. See Code
Napoleon, annotated by Blackwood Wright, Section 524, note (q).
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This quotation from 1.abuo carries us back to the Golden Age of Roman
law. Ulpian was one of that great coterie of philosophic jurists of the third
century of the Christian era, and Labeo, whom he quotes, belonging to the
Age of Augustus, was one **in whom a wider culture had instilled a love of
general principles." The New York Court, in Snedeker v. Waring, by adopt-
ing the Roman law principle into our system, has brought our law into con-
formuity with justice. By comparing the English case of Wiltshear v. Cottrell
and the American case of Snedeker v. Waring, both belonging to the middle
of the nineteenth century, with the cases of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, quoted above, it will be noted that the late casts come out just as
the earlier ones, half right and half wrong, on exactly the same state of facts,
so long as we reason deductively from the definition of "annexation," giving
to the word in the one case the strictly literal meaning of annexation; i. e.,
a physical interlocking of the particles of matter, and in the other, the holding
together by an intangible force. But just as soon. as the court realizes that the
real question to be decided is not the grammatical meaning of a word but
what should be the rights of the parties under all the facts in the controversy,
we arrive at conclusions in accordance with justice and fair dealing. The
facts to be considered are in general:
(W). The physical relations of the things, i. e., the nature of the annex-
ation (see all the old cases cited above).
(2). The intention of the parties; to be determined, (a) by the rela-
tions of the parties, whether landlord and tenant (the ordinary case) ; mort-
gagor and mortgagee, Holland v. Hodgdon, Exch. Ch. L. R. 7 C. P. 328
(872) ; vendor and vendee, Dustin v. Crosby, 75 Me. 75, (1883) ; simple tort
feasor or one acting with the purpose of condemning the property, Justice v.
Nesquehoning Valley -Ry. Co., 87 Pa. 28 (1878). (b) by the nature of the
thing, i. e., whether trade fixture or not, Squire & Co. v. Portland, io6 Me.
234, (199o). (c) by the custom of the locality. Gas stoves, realty, Bank v.
Realty, Corp., 137 App. Div. (N.Y.) 45, (igo) ; also the principal case. Gas
stoves, personalty, Hook v. Bolton, ix9 Mass. 244, (i9o8). The New York
Court in deciding Bank v. Realty Corp. said, "It is a matter of common
knowledge [in King's County] that heating and cooking form a part of
the necessary and permanent equipment of a tenement house; that they are
not ordinarily supplied by tenants, and there is evidence in the record of such
custom." Following a similar course of reasoning, the Massachusetts court
in Hook v. Bolton, supra, quotes from a previous Massachusetts' decision
to the effect that "the tendency of the modern cases is to make this a question
of the intention with which the machine was put in place. Hopewell Mills v.
Taunton Savings Bank, 150 Mass. 522 (i89o).
If the courts would only pay due heed to this suggestion of the Massa-
chusetts court and. forget the age-long grammatical litigation of the word
"annexation," it would go far toward attaining just decisions in the majority
of cases, and would free our reports of much useless lumber in the citation
of ancient precedents. In every instance the question is not what the name
of a legal concept is, but what can the parties legally do. What the courts
have done is certainly law, and is more significant than what the courts have
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said about the nature ot a legal concept. By seeking first a definition and
then proceeding by the formal grammatical method of the sixteenth century,
we reach the goal of justice in about half the cases. If we ask first, what
the rights of the litigant parties are, and then inquire, what are the facts
of thq controversy; including, first, the physical relations of the things, then,
the character of the parties, the nature of the thing, and the custom of the
locality, in order to satisfy the reasonable expectation and legal intention
of the parties to the controversy, we increase the coincidence of law and jus-
tice by nearly a hundred per cent. In the interest of the efficient administra-
tion of justice, the modem scientific method seems to have decided advan-
tages. J.H.D.
EFrEcr OF AN AGREEMENT BY ONE PERSON.TO SUPPLY ANOTHER'S "RE-
QUIREMENTS" OF A GIVEN COMMoDITY.-The cases show that the kind of agree-
ment indicated by the heading of this note has become an established part of
business usage. In normal times such an agreement is likely to be carried
out to the entire satisfaction of both parties, without question, but, in a
period of changing business conditions and abnormal price flctuations such
as we have witnessed during the last few years, nice questions of interpreta-
tion are likely to arise, as is well illustrated by the recent case of Oscar
Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter Coopers Glue Factory, (192o) 179 N. Y. S. 271.
The defendant agreed to supply' the plaintiff with its "requirements of
'Special BB' glue for the year x916" at nine cents per pound, deliveries to
be made as ordered by it. The plaintiff was a jobber and, as defendant well
knew, bought only for re-sale to the trade. When it received an order for
glue it sent a requisition to the defendant which filled it. Similar contracts
had been entered into by the parties for each of the four years immediately
preceding the contract in question. During that time the price of glue had
remained stable, and plaintiff had secured orders for from sixty to seventy
barrels, of 500 pounds each, per year. During the latter part of the year
1gi6, the price of glue went steadily upward from nine to twenty-five cents
per pound. The plaintiff, evidently not averse to doing a little profiteering,
having increased its sales force from eight to eighteen, pushed the sale of
glue to such an extent-sometimes apparently by offering it at a substantial
reduction from the prevailing market price-that it succeede4 in getting
orders amounting, for the year, to three hundred and forty barrels. Defend-
ant shipped one hundred and thirty barrels but refused to supply the balance,
and when sued, resisted a recovery on two grounds, viz., (x) that the agree-
ment was not binding for want of mutuality. (2) that in any event the 
word
"requirements," properly interpreted, meant simply that defendant was to
supply glue to an amount substantially equivalent to what had been ordered
by the plaintiff during the preceding year. Both points were resolved against
the defendant by a divided court.
It seems quite Obvious that in the proper interpretation of the word "re-
quirements," as used in the agreement, is to be found the correct 
solution
of both of the problems suggested by the defendant. According to the usual
definition given by standard dictionaries the word may be used 
in eitner
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one of two distinct senses. It may mean (I) the act of requiring or demand-
ing, (2) something required or needed. If the word is to be interpreted in
the sense first indicated, then it is clear that the agreement is not a contract
for want of a sufficient consideration to support the seller's promise. If the
buyer agrees to take only what he requires in the sense of what he 'demands'
or calls for, his promise is wholly illusory, since it amounts to no more than
saying that he will do what he will do. See American etc. Co. v. Kirk, 68
Fed. 791; Teipel v. Meyer, io6 Wis. 4t; Cold Blast Transp. Co. v. K. C. Bolt
and Nut Co., 114 Fed. 77. But if it is to be interpreted in the second sense
to mean that the buyer will take from the seller what he needs, then there
is consideration, for if he buys what he needs from the seller, he necessarily
gives up the right to buy elsewhere and consequently suffers a legal detri-
ment. Following the principle which says" that a "contract, if capable of two
equally reasonable interpretations, should be given that interpretation which
will tend to support it," (Lurton, J., in Lima Locomotive etc. Co. v. National
etc. Co., 155 Fed. 77) the courts have quite generally upheld such agreements.
Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal Co., i6o Ill. 85; T. W. Jenkins &
Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958, and cases therein cited. Courts
have at times assumed that, because of a supposed requirement of mutuality,
this result would follow only in a case where the agreement is made in con-
nection with an established business, having needs capable of reasonably
definite pre-estimate; and have held that the agreement is unenforcible
where, as in the principal case, the buyer buys for re-sale only and is in such
a position as to make it uncertain whether or not he will need any of the
commodity at all. T. W. Jenkins Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 237 Fed. 278,
commented on in 15 MICH. L. Rgv. 441, reversed 247 Fed. 958; Crane v. Crane
& Co., io5 Fed. 869. The same supposed requirement has in a few cases
been relied upon as a basis for the holding that the buyer impliedly promises
to continue his business for.the period during which the contract, by its
terms, is to continue in force-the theory being that if he continues in busi-
ness he will need a quantity of the commodity, and thus there will be
present the requisite rIutuality: Hickey v. O'Brien, 123 Mich. 61i; Wells v.
Alexandre, 13o N. Y. 642; Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tenn. Phosphate
Co., 121 Fed. 298. Such decisions are clearly erroneous. All that the phrase
"mutuality of obligation" can legitimately be held to mean in this connection
is, that to make a bilateral agreement enforcible as a contract, each side must
furnish a consideration. In accord with the principal case on this point
are the following: T. W. Jenkins Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., supra; Ramey
Lumber Co. v. John Schroeder Lumber Co., 237 Fed. 39; McKeever etc. Co.
v. Canonsburg Iron Co., 138 Pa. St. 184; Western Macaroni Mfg. Co. v.
Fiore, 47 Utah io8. The anomalous decisions just referred to have appar-
ently resulted from a belief on the part of some courts that they were
necessary to prevent a gross injustice being perpetrated upon the seller.
They have thought that without the requirement of mutuality, as they inter-
preted it, the seller would be wholly at the mercy of the buyer. Disregarding
the obvious argument that the seller entered into the agreement with his
eyes open, which after all is not an answer to the position taken, there seems
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to be another means of accomplishing the result aimed at-the protection of
the seller-which is perfectly consistent with the fundamental principles of
contract law.
. The word, "requirements," as used in the agreement, is capable of and
demands further interpretatioh to determine the extent of the obligation
of the buyer and the seller respectively. In other words, does the word,
"requirements," connote that the buyer will take and the seller will furnish
any quantity, however large or small, that the buyer may need in any con-
ceivable contingency which may arise; or does it indicate a quantity variable
within certain somewhat indefinite but nevertheless real limits,--the quantity
purposely being left indefinite by the parties because of the uncertainty due
to normal fludtuations in needs. Either use of the word would seem to be
legitimate. It does not require any stretch of the imagination to see that
when the seller agrees to furnish to another, who is engaged in a business
with which the former is familiar, "his requirements," he has in mind a
quantity capable of fairly definite pre-estimate. The word may be intended
as the equivalent of the statement of a definite quantity qualified with the
words "more or less," which it is held merely provide against slight and acci-
dental variations. Hills v. Edmund Pcycke Co., 14 Cal. App. 32; Geiger v.
Kaesiner, 148 Ill. App. 529; Santa Paula Commercial Co. v. Parkhurst-Dazis
Mercantile Co., 86 Kan. 328; Little Rock Cooperage Co. v. Gunnels, 82 Ark.
286.
Obviously no a priori rule can be laid down for determining in a particular
case which interpretation is the correct one. This must depend upon the
apparent intention of the parties to be deduced from all the circumstances
surrounding the transaction. If it appears that the obligation was reasonably
understood to be unlimited, there is no valid reason why it should not be
enforced in that way, but, on the other hand, if it was not so understood, then
justice and common sense alike* demand that it be not so enforced. As is
said in POLLOCK ON CONTRACTS (3rd Am. Ed.) 308, 309, "We must look to the
state of things as known to and affecting the parties at the time of the
promise, including their information and competence with regard to the ma-
ter in hand, and then see what expectation the promisor's words, as uttered
in that state of things, would have created in the mind of a reasonable man
in" the promisee's place and with the same ineans of judgment." Viewed
from this angle the conclusion of the majority of the court in the principal
case would seem to be erroneous. If all the circumstances are taken into
account it is difficult to suppose that the plaintiff could reasonably have be-
lieved that the defendant intended to bind itself to supply an unlimited
quantity. For a case apparently taking the view here suggested see T. TV.
Jenkins Co. v. Anaheim Sugar Co., 247 Fed. 958, 962 (semble). On this
basis the result in such cases as Hickey v. O'Brien, Wells v. Alexandre, and
Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tenn. Phosphate Co., cited supra, becomes in-
telligible. Where the facts show that the buyer is to make a special effort to
push the sale of the seller's product then such a limitation on the seller's
obligation obviously should not and does not exist. See New York Central
Iron Works v. U. S. Radiator Co., 174 N. Y. 331. G. C. G.
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CONFLICT OF LAWS-THE LAW CONTROLLING THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIED
VOMAN'S CONTRACT.-The case of Poole v. Perkins (Va.), IO S. E. 240,
involves that troublesome question of whether the validity of a contract is
to be ruled by the law of the place where made, or by that of the place of
performance.
Mrs. Poole joined with her husband in the execution and delivery ih Ten-
nessee, where they were domiciled, of a promissory note to the order of
Perkins, also domiciled in Tennessee, the note being payable in Virginia.
By the law of Tennessee the contracts of married women could not be
enforced against her. By the law of Virginia she was bound by them.
It is a little dificult to determine whether the court, in concluding that
the law of the place of performance should control, does so intending to an-
nounce the broad rule that what is the applicable law is 1o be determined
by discovering what was the intention of the parties as to the law to be ap-
plied, or whether it does so intending to announce that the general rule is,
that the validity of a contract is to be determined by applying the law of the
place fixed for performance.
There is abundance of authority from courts having the highest regard
of the profession, on both sides of these questions. The aim therefore will
be, not so much to attempt a discussion of the cases pro and con, as to briefly
present the question in the light of general principles.
It may well be said that the ultimate aim in the administration of civil
justice, is to effectuate the intention of parties interested. So one essaying
the solution of the question of what law should be applied in determining
the validity of a contract, regard should doubtless be had for this principle.
I In the case under discussion there is no evidence of what was the inten-
tion of the parties, aside from the facts that their contract was actually cre-
ated, so far as it may be said to have been created at all, in Tennessee, and
that it provided for payment in Virginia. Apparently, -except for the fact
that the state line between the two states ran through it, Bristol in Tennes-
see and Bristol in Virginia were one town. The note was made and deliv-
ered in the Tennessee part of the town while payment was provided for at
the bank which happened to be in the Virginia part of the town; this being
done as a mere matter of convenience, with no particular thought of what
was the law of either state upon the capacity of a married woman to contract.
The question presented therefore, upon this theory of determining the
applicable law, is one of whether the fact that the law of the place of per-
formance, if applied, will establish validity, while the law of the place of
making, if applied, will defeat all obligation, is in itself sufficent to require
the conclusion, really as a matter of law, that the parties intended the appli-
cation of the law which would give validity. Apart from the matter of judi-
cial authority, to conclude that the parties intended validity rather than in-
validity is not to draw a long bow. But it is not to be overlooked that it is
one thing to say that, and quite ariother to say, that the note was made pay-
able in Virginia because they appreciated that the law of that state upheld
such contracts while the law of the state of Tennessee did not. In the opin-
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ion of the writer it is doubtful whether any case can be found declaring the
law to be, that the fact alone, that the law of one jurisdiction will enforce
the contract while the law of the other will refuse enforcement, is 
sufficient
to require the conclusion that the parties intended that the law of one 
rather
than the other, should rule their act. Numberless cases justify the admissi-
bility of this fact as evidentiary, but none so far as the writer has 
discov-
ered, holds that it will outweigh the natural presumption that one expects
his acts and conduct to be judged by the law of the place where he acts.
The three cases in 9st, 93rd and 95th of Virginia reports, referred 
to in
the opinion on this question, all involve the principle as applied 
in usury
cases where a definite rule has grown up permitting the parties 
to contract
for the rate obtaining in either jurisdiction.
Professor Beale points out, 23 HARV. LAW REv. 260, that to allow 
indi-
viduals to choose the law by which they will be bound is opposed 
to our
system of jurisprudence. Law is an imposition by the state, using its legis-
lative arm upon all persons within its jurisdiction, and such persons cannot
choose not to be bound by it. They cannot will that they shall not 
be sub-
ject to its operation, nor that their conduct shall not be controlled by it. It
is no answer to this argument to say that they do so choose 
when they go
from one jurisdiction to another to consummate their act iri order to secure
the application of the law of that jurisdiction. In this sense every person doing
any voluntary act may be said to choose the law determining 
the conse-
quences bf his act, because he might do it somewhere else. It is 
one thing
to say that one may secure the application to his act of the law of 
a particu-
lar jurisdiction by going there and doing the act, and quite another to say
that he may act in one jurisdiction, and by willing that the law of another
shall control the consequences of his act, escape the consequences 
of the ap-
plication of the local law.
"This intention," says Mr. Dicey in referring to the intention 
which some-
times influences the determination of the proper law, "is 
a quite different
thing from the intention which, in the absence of fraud, or the 
like, must
always exist that a contract may be valid; it is a different thing 
also from
the intention that a contract made in fact under the law of one country, shall,
as to its validity, be governed by the law of some other country. 
This is
clearly a result that cannot be affected by the will of the partied." 
DicFY ON
CONFLICr OF LAWS, 555.
Mr. Wharton, in speaking to exactly the same question 
as that involved
in the case under discussion says, "The capacity of parties 
to contract is one
of those matters which relates to the question of whether, 
in a legal sense,
any contract has been brought into existence, 'and its governing 
law should
be determined by a fixed rule, not dependent upon the will 
of the parties;
and as a matter of fact, while the courts have not always 
agreed upon the
rule, they have seldom referred the ultimate question of 
the governing law
in this respect, to the intention of the parties." WHARTON 
ON CONFLICT O1:
LAWS, 904.
Mr. Minor, in his "CoNFLICT or LAWS," uses this language, "The 
design
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or purposc of the parties to enter into a valid contract, .tanding alone, can
never siffice to validate a contract prolioitcd by the law, nor to invalidate a
contract not legally prohibited. * * * The question therefore, where the valid-
ity of the contract is under investigation, is not what law do the parties in-
tend shall govern a particular element, but wh.'.t law shall actually govern it."
MINOR, CONFLICT oF LAWS, p. 401. Mr. Minor then proceeds to show that
a contract may fail because the things done, where done, do -not create a
contract, or because to perform tle contract in .he place provided for per-
fo.'mance is not permitted by the lhw of that place, or because the "considera-
tion for the contract involves the doing of something in a jurisdiction
where, to do the thing is prohibited. In other words the question may
relate to the matter of creation of the contract, or to its performance, or to
its conslderation, and the controllirng law is to be determined by determina-
tion of the situs of that element of the contract involved.
It is an easy conclusion that the matter of "capacity" of a party to make
a particular contract relates itself, not to the performance, nor to the consid-
eration, but to the creation of the contract. Without capacity the party can-.
not create.
The fact that the act in performance of the contract is ruled by the law
of the place of the act in performance, and the act which furnishes the con-
sideration for the contract, is ruled by the law of the place of that act, is
but a supporting argument for the contention that the act of making shall be
ruled by the law of the place of the act of creation.
The court in its op;nion in the case being discussed, gives countenance
to the doctrine that "where the contract is made in one place and is to be
performed in another, not only may the law of the latter be properly called
the (law of) the locus contractus, but that it ought in all respects, except
as to the formalities and solemnities and modes of execution, to be deemed
the rule to govern such cases." The serious objection to such a conclusion.
involving as it does the proposition that if the place where the contract is
actually executed differs from the place of performance, then the place of
making is the place of performance, is its wide departure from fact. It sug-
gests the homely adage that "one can't make a calf's tail a leg by "calling it
one". No emphasis can be put on words used, sufficient, or so placed, as to
make Virginia the place of making of the contract, when every act having
to do with its coming into existence is done in Tennessee, all the parties at
the time were there and there domiciled. The universally recognized rule
in the law of contracts is that the contract is made in that place where the
last step is taken to make it a binding obligation, the contract in question
was fully created in so far as it had any existence, long before there was
anything having reference to it done, or to be done, in Virginia, and no
step, at any time was taken in Virginia having anything to do with its crea-
tion. If the contract was ever born, no more misleading statement could be
made than to say that its birth-place was Virginia.
But it is said, that apart from the contention that intent of parties con-
trols, and apart from the theory that the place of -making is the place of per-
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formance regardless of the place where the contract actually comes
into being, there is still a hard and fast rule that where the place of making
is different from the place of performance, the contract is ruled, as to its
validity, by the law of the place of performance, and authorities sufficient in
numbers to satisfy of the existence of almost any other rule of law can be
found in support of the proposition. Certainly as respectable showing of
authority can be found in opposition. Whence this confusion? It seems
best accounted for by recognizing that there has been a failure to analyze
the contract and note that its different elements, the making, the perform-
ance and the consideration, may each have its own situs differing from each
of the others, and therefore each have its own law controlling it. Some court
has iightly enough decided some time that a contract was void because the
law of the place of its performance made it void, and some other court has
adopted the decision as establishing the doctrine that the validity of a con-
tract is ruled by the law of the place fixed for its performance. If the first
case involved the question of the lawfulness of doing the act required for
performance it might well conclude that the place where the act is to be done
,should furnish the answering rule. Whereas it would be absurd to contend
that such a decision should furnish the rule for a case where the question
of validity had no felation to the place or matter of performance.
Excellent discussions of the questions involved in the case examined,
may be -found in 'the following authorities; many of which are referred to
in the opinion of the court:
Campbell v. Crampton, 2 Fed. 414; Union National Bank v. Chapman, 169
N. Y. 538, 57 L. R. A. 513, 88 Am. St. Rep. 614; Burr v. Beckler,'264 Ill. 230,
L. R. A. i9i6A, io49. The reports of Bank v. Chapman and Burr v. Beckler
in L. R. A. are accompanied with excellent notes. To these should be added
the case of Mayer v. Robhe, 77 N. J. Law, 681, 26 L. IR A. (N. S.) 763, and
-note, and the text citations given supra. V. H. L.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF ABSTRACT BOOKS--LITERARY PROPERTY, IMPLIED CON-
TRACT OF SECRECY, UNFAIR TPADE.-A recent case before the Supreme Court
of Washington raises some novel and interesting questions. A company
engaged in the abstract business mortgaged its "records, bookt, plats." Af-
ter suit was commenced to foreclose the mortgage, the mortgagor, who re-
mained in possession, made photographic copies of the records and sold them
to the defendant who had notice of the mortgage of the originals. The fore-
closure resulted in a sale of the property, described as in the mortgage, to the
plaintiff. Whether plaintiff knew at this time of the existence of the copies
,does not appear. Plaintiff is using the original records in the conduct of an
abstract business and defendant is using the copies in competition with him.
The action was brought to recover the copies. The court holds that it can-
not be maintained because, assuming that the mortgage included the copies,
the copies were not embraced in the sheriff's sale. It asserts, obiter, that the
mortgagee might have enjoined the making of the copies, and it -raises, but
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declines to answer, some other questions concerning the rights of the parties.
Wintlcr Abstract Co. v. Sears (Wash., 1919), 184 Pac. 3o9.
If it was procedurally impossible to treat the action as an equitable suit
to compel surrender of the copies for destruction, the decision was clearly
right. There would seem to be no theory which would support a common
law possessory action. The doctrine of accession most nearly suffices but,
while the case bears some analogy to those of young of animals, it is impos-
sible to extend that doctrine to embrace reproductions by. the hand of man,
involving neither mutilation of the original nor confusion.
But what of other remedies? Ownership of things ordinarily involves no
exclusive right to photograph or copy the things, though the exercise of
the exclusive right of possession may make photographing or copying by
others physically impossible. Sports Press Agency v. "Our Dogs" Publish-
ing Co. [1gi6], 2 K. B. 88o; Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83; Key-
stone Type Foundry v. Portland Publishing Co., i86 Fed. 69o. A fortiori,
the limited interest of a mortgagee ordinarily gives no such exclusive right.
But the subject of this mortgage was peculiar, and upon its peculiarity the
mortgagee, and the purchaser under him, may well base a claim to protection
from the dishonest acts of the mortgagor and his purchaser. There aire three
distinct theories which might plausibly be argued: (i) literary property,
(2) implied contract, (3) unfair competition.
In the facts which constitute the subject matter of abstract books, no one.
of course, can have any property. But, as a compilation of information, such
books would seem to be within the doctrine of literary property. Dart v.
Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399; Perry v. Big Rapids, 67 Mich. 146; Banker v.
Caldzvell, 3 ,Nlinn. 94; Vernon Abstract Co. v. Waggoner Title Co., 49 Tex.
Civ. App. i44 (seinble). In Leon Abstract Co. v. Equalization Board, 86 Ia.
127, a contrary conclusion was based on the fact that such books are not a
"work of genius or the development of new tho.ughts or ideas" (dissenting
opinion in Perry v. Big Rapids, supra, adopted by this court), and upon the
fact that the manuscript was not designed for publication but was designed
to be kept from publication. Both lines of reasoning are unsound. Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., i88 U. S. 239; Prince Albert v. Strange, 2
DeG. & Sm. 652. The Supreme Court of Washington, however, is commit-
ted to this view. Booth Co. v. Phelps, 8 Wash. 549.
If the theory of literary property be admitted at all, the next question is
whether there has been such a general publication as to destroy it. In Ver-
non Abstract Co. v. Waggoner Title Co., supra, it was held that furnishing
abstracts to the general public was such a publication, the limited purpose of
the publication being considered immaterial. The opposite is implicit in the
Michigan and Minnesota decisions, and the case would seem to be much
stronger than some of the cases of limited publication, e. g., stage production
of a play, Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32; or delivery to university classes
of a lecture, Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326.
Literary property can be transferred without any particular formality and,
although sale of a manuscript or painting may be made with reservation of
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the right of reproduction, such a sale may imply an assignment of that right.
Parton v. Prang, 3 Cliff. 537. In view of the comparative uselessness of ab-
stract books without the exclusive right of reproduction, the mortgage and
the sheriff's sale of the books can easily be said to impliedly embrace the lit-
erary property. The right of user, as incident to the right of possession, may
remain in the. mortgagor until foreclosure, but this cannot embrace the right
to make copies for use in derogation of the mortgage of the literary property.
Plaintiff, then, is entitled to enjoin the use of the copies by the mortgagor or
by any purchaser with notice, and is probably entitled to have the copies de-
stroyed. Prince Albert v. Strange, supra.
If the theory of literary property fails, plaintiff may fall back on implied
contract or trust. In the same way, some courts dealing with the right to
prevent general use by a professional photographer of a portrait photograph,
hesitating to recognize a right of privacy, have based relief on implied con-
tract or breach of confidence. Pollard v. Photographic Co.,-L. RL 40 Ch.
Div. 345. Plaintiff's theory is-that, in making the mortgage, the mortgagor
impliedly promised not to make copies of the records to be used by himself
or any one else in competition with the transferee of the originals. Here,
again, the basis for implication is principally the comparative uselessness of
the records if copies are at large. Our case is in many respects analogous to, if
indeed it is not parcel of, the cases on trade secrets. A trade secret is any in-
formation valuable to a business enterprise which the possessor thereof with-
holds from the general public. Its legal protection depends entirely upon con-
tract or trust, express or implied, and implications are freely indulged in this
field, 44 L. R. A. (N.S.) ri6o, note. In the usual case, the information is dis-
closed by the original possessor to an employee and the latter is charged with
the obligation not to disclose or to use for himself such information. There the
obligation is implied from the confidential nature of the disclosure. But the
principle has been reversed where the original possessor of the information
has sold the information to another. Here the implied obligation arises from
the equity against derogating from one's own grant. Pomeroy Ink Co. v.
Pomeroy, 77 N. J. Eq. 293. That is precisely our case, and it seems easy
enough to make out the implied obligation of mortgagor to mortgagee. But
the latter has lost all right to complain, having been paid by the foreclosure,
and, on the other hand, no relief is adequate which does not reach the pur-
chaser from the mortgagor. Can we connect the benefits and burdens of -the
implied contract with the plaintiff and defendant, respectively? It is sub-
mitted that the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay is adequate to the task. This
doctrine applies to pdrsonal property as well as land, though in a large per-
centage of the cases which have come before the courts relief has been denied
because the covenant was held to contravene public policy. Murphy v. Chris-
tian Press Co., 38 N. Y. App. Div. 426. That "covenants" may be implied, is
well settled. 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 962, note; The covenant touches and con-
cerns the records in a most vital way Though it creates a mere "easement
of monopoly," it is easily distinguishable from Norcross v. James, I4o Mass.
188, in that monopoly, more or less extensive, is here of the very essence of
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
normal enjoyment. A fortiori, the case is within those authorities opposed
to Norcross v. James. The benefit of the covenant, having been from the
first so vitally connected with the records, would pass with the recorqs with-
out express assignment. JOLLY, RzsTRIcTIvz COVENANTS, 43. And see Vulcan
Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 243; Pomeroy Ink Co. v.
Pomeroy, supra; both holding that the benefit of an implied obligation not-to
use or disclose trade secrets passes with the obligee's business. The burden
of the covenant, at first personal, attached to the copies when made, and
passed with the copies to the purchaser without notice. Lewis v. Gollner, 129
N. Y. 227. And see the trade secret cases where relief has been given third
parties with notice. Tabor v. Hoffman, ii8 N. Y. 30; Pressed Steel Car Co.
v. Standard Steel Car Co., 210 Pa. 464.
If it be thought that both these theories are pressed too far, the plaintiff
falls back on the doctrine of unfair competition, as applied in Associated Press
v. International News Service, 248 U. S. 215. The similarity of the cases,
assuming that neither iterary property nor implied contract can be made out
here, is striking. The conspicuous difference, that there the parties were
strangers; while here they are related through the mortgage and subsequent
sales, makes our case the stronger. The formula of the Press- Case, that one
shall not "reap where he has not sown," needs only to be inverted--one shall
not reap where he has bargained and sold his sowing. It may, of course, be
doubted whether the court was justified in its application of this ethical
principle, and it is quite certain that this ethical principle cannot be applied
generally without overturning much settled law. See dissenting opinion of
Brandeis, J., and note, 13 ILL. L. REV. 7o8. But the ethics of our case is at
least as clear as that of the Associated Press case.
It may be admitted that this case taxes our legal dogmas, but it will be a
reproach to the law if, when the plaintiff's case is properly presented, he
cannot be given relief. E. N. D.
LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES FOR NEGLIGENCE IN TRANSMISSION O
INTERSTATE MESSAGE.-In the January number of the LAw REviEw (18 MIcH.
L. REV. 248) was noted the case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Southuick,
214 S. W. 987, holding that the Act of Congress, June 18, 1910, c. 300, Sec.
7, did not cover the question of liability of interstate telegraph companies for
negligence. Consequently the question was held to be governed by the ruie
of the Texas state courts holding invalid printed stipulations on the tele-
gram blank, limiting the liability of the company, for mistakes in transmis-
sion, to the price of the telegram, unless -repeated, etc. Shorty after the
Southwick case, the case of Bowman. & Bull Co. v. Postal Tel-Cable Co.,
124 N. E. 851, was reported, in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held
similarly, a very able opinion of Thompson, J., covering the question thor-
oughly. On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Washington held, in
Rash'er-Kingman-Herrin Co. v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 185 Pac. 947, that by
the amendment of igio Congress covered the field of liability of telegraph
companies on interstate messages. Close on the heels of these decisions,
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'however, came two decisions by the United States Supreme Court (Postal
Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Lumber Co., decided December 8, 1919,
and Western- Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, decided Jan. 12, i920), holding that
the amendment of igio covers the question of liability of telegraph companies
doing interstate business, and hence superseded all rulings of. state courts
on the subject. In the former there was a Mississippi statute rendering void
stipulations limiting liability for negligence; in the Boegli Case there was
a law imposing a penalty for failure to deliver promptly interstate telegrams.
As for the question which is decided in these two cases, we can not heip
thinking that the reasoning of the Illinois court in Bowmi & Bull Co. v.
Postal Tel.-Cable Co., supra, is sounder. The Act of I91O nowhere mentions
the question of liability; and the authority to establish different rates for
different classes of messages, (e.g. repeated, unrepeated, etc.) would not
seem to imply control over liability, as the essential difference between the
classes of messages is one of, service. However, all state rulings are now
beside the point and the question can have no more than academic interest.
Now that the Supreme Court has held the matter of liability on inter-
state messages to be under Federal control, the question arises as to whether
it will hold valid or invalid these stipulations for limited liability. The com-
mentator in the January number of the MICHIGAN LAW Rvjmw assumes that
the court will hold them valid, basing his statement on an analogy to decisions
already made as to liability of carriers of goods. In such cases the holding is
that the carrier may limit ita liability for negligence, by "fair, open, and
just" agreements, to an agreed value. Due to the great discrepancies in rates,
which appear to bear no relation to the cost of insurance, this amounts prac-
tically to an exemption from liability, when goods of great value are the
subject of shipment (see 17 MICH. L. REv. 183, and previous comments cited
therein). That the Federal courts will follow this trend finds support in
the decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the case of Cultra v.
IV. U. Tel. Co., (Unrepeated Message Case), 44 I. C. C. Rep. 670, and in
Gardner v. W. U. Tel. Co., 231 Fed. 405. In the former case the Interstate
Commerce. Commission said, "If as a matter of law, the rate charged and
collected for an unrepeated message carries with it the same protection to the
sender or recipient and imposes upon the telegraph company the same liabil-
ity a'd degree of care as the rate for a repeated message, then the express
authority of the Congress to maintain classifications of repeated and unre-
peated messages, with the different rates attached thereto, is without signifi-
jance or effect.' However it must be remembered that there is a difference of
service which accounts for the difference of rates, and hence the quotation
is not strictly accurate. Telegram blanks usually carry a stipulation for
insurance at a rate of two per cent for all amounts above fifty dollars
(which is the limitation of liability for repeated messages) ; but this provis-
ion is useless, for aside from the excessive charicter of the charge, how is
the sender to determine the amount of insurance to carry? He cannot
know what sort of mistake the operator's negligence may lead to; it may even
result in damage greater than the value of the goods referred to in the
message. The excessive charge for insurance could be corrected by appro-
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priate regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission, but not so the
conjectural nature of resulting damages. In this respect the problem of the
liability of telegraph companies differs from that of carriers of goods, for in
the case of the latter the value of the goods can be ascertained.
It would seem that stipulations limiting the telegraph company's liability
for negligence should be held unreasonable, and yet the Supreme Court seems
implicitly to incline the other way. In Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren-
Godwin Lumber Co., supra, the court said, "as in terms the act empowered
telegraph companies to establish reasonable rates, subject to the control
which the Act to Regulate Commerce exerted, it follows that the power thus
given, limited of course by such control, carried with it the primary authority
to provide a rate for unrepeated telegrams and the right to fix a reasonable
limitation of responsibility where such rate was charged * * *" Although
this does not expressly hold the stipulation reasonable, it seems to imply
as much; the case was "remanded for further proceedings not ,inconsistent
with this opinion." R. G. D.
